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Changes Within the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea’s Society: Involvement  
of the Non–Governmental Actors
Non–Governmental Organizations (NGO) activities in the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea (DPRK) are specified by missing mutual diplomatic representation 
between the two Koreas, and also between the DPRK and the US. This fact helps to 
increase the importance and prestige of NGOs, the role of individuals and groups in 
cultural, sport and civic exchanges when participating in mediation of humanitarian 
and development aid to the DPRK. The entrepreneurs, who are willing to invest in 
DPRK (despite the adverse conditions) and employ North Korean workers, play an 
irreplaceable role as well. A summary of these activities provides an overall picture of 
the presence and impact of non–governmental actors.
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1. Introduction
When the hard grip of the Soviet Union weakened in the second half 
of 1980s, the Eastern European nations lost their “center of gravity” and 
they were left for themselves. After four decades they could encounter 
a new wind of changes. It was right after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, when other East European regimes1 started to fall like “leaves from 
a dead tree.” People in the Eastern European region had a dream that oth-
1 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.
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er communist countries around the world as well could be freed from the 
shackles of communism. But reality was somehow different. Few of the 
remaining communist countries underwent some form of transformation 
(China, Vietnam), while the others did not at all (Cuba and North Korea). 
The hope that came from Eastern Europe was unfounded for North Korea 
at that time. Simply said, the situation in North Korea was not ripe for 
change yet (Frank 2010, p. 6).
For the past 25 or so years we have been witnesses to a periodical 
recurring phenomenon of the DPRK’s collapse predictions. There are nu-
merous scholars, “Pyongyang watchers,” former advisors on North Korea 
and even North Korean defectors who predicted a collapse of the North 
Korean regime over and over again (Rosen 2012). On the contrary, there 
are also those who oppose that idea (Lynn 2012). Nonetheless, even after 
70 years the Korean Peninsula is still divided and for external observers it 
seems that the North Korean regime remains stable today (partially seen 
from the perspective of successful power inheritance from Kim I to Kim II 
and finally to Kim III).2 We observe that the changes in the international 
environment together with sanctions against the regime have not contrib-
uted to its collapse. We could have concluded that the predictions of the 
North Korean collapse expected to happen right after the end of the Cold 
War were made on wrong assumptions and, very likely, the North Korean 
regime is going to survive another decade or two. But it is essential not to 
make the same mistake in predicting the future when the surge of changes 
within North Korean society happens now.
What is the probability that the North Korean regime will survive 
another decade? Many experts tend to believe that the regime under Kim 
Jong–un has embarked on the path of reforms and this will enable him 
(with support of regime friendly China) to ensure the continued persis-
tence for a long time (Ulfelder 2012). But the “reforms” are more ideo-
logical proclamations of the regime with an intention to hide structural 
problems of society targeting the vulnerable population. And there is 
no guarantee that China will continue to provide subsidies (food, crude 
oil or other commodities) worth 1 billion USD per year (Manyin 2014, 
p. 15) in the next future without no return value (except quasi stability 
on the Korean Peninsula) and to have a protective hand over North Ko-
rea (Babson 2013, p. 163). If not, the fate of North Korean collapse is 
inevitable. Despite of proclaimed stability there are certain signs that the 
2 Kim I refers to Kim Il–sung, Kim II to Kim Jong–il and Kim III to Kim Jong–un.
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North Korean regime is gradually declining. It could be perceived from 
various perspectives – economic, political, strategic, military, societal 
etc. As Bruce Bennett (2013, p. 6) said outspokenly “A collapse would 
clearly be the more challenging case, and thus it makes an appropriate 
focus for planning.” It is better to be prepared in this non predictable 
environment.
In fact, this paper is not focusing on counting the probability of the 
North’s collapse. It is rather an account of possible implications of non–
governmental activities that have been present in DPRK for the past twen-
ty years, and how are they connected to a change within North Korean 
society that could undergo in the near future.
2. A Picture of North Korean Society
Historically, Korean society (regardless whether in the North or in the 
South) has always been highly stratified where place of birth, inborn social 
status, family origin, etc. determined the value and valence (proximity to 
the center of power) of an individual (Collins 2012, p. 6). Communism 
did not change this characteristic, only regrouped it. North Korea’s geo-
graphical conditions, namely mountainous terrain, richness in natural 
resources, scarcity of arable land,3 relatively higher concentration of in-
dustry compared to the southern part of the Korean Peninsula are essen-
tial in explaining the structure of North Korean society (Noland 2004, 
p. 19). These left deep imprints in the overall structure of the society in 
the North even before the peninsula’s division. 
Another aspect that predestined the character of North Korean soci-
ety was ideological foundations of North Korea. In short, the ideology4 
evolved over time and developed into a  mixture of remains of Confu-
cianism, anti–imperialism and colonialism, North Korean national-
ism, strong sectarianism (regionalism, origin of birth etc.), Marxism 
(only minor), Stalinism and self–reliance (Myers 2010). It is referred to 
as “Kimilsungism” or Juche ideology (in Korean: Juche sasang). This in 
turn conditioned the creation of societal structure which perfectly reflects 
these ideological predispositions.
3 In fact, one of the reasons why Kim Il–sung started the Korean War was to gain access 
to arable land rich South, in order for Korea to be independent of external powers.
4 Kim Il–sung is officially the author of the Juche ideology, but in reality it was a team 
of his ideologists.
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The last, but not least, aspect when looking at North Korean soci-
ety is the relatively high degree of urbanization (compared to other Asian 
countries – China, Vietnam, Philippines etc.) that raised over decades. 
So, currently around 70 percent of the population in North Korea lives in 
cities. Unlike the Chinese who are still living mostly in the countryside 
and who can sustain themselves due to their farming lifestyle, the North 
Korean urban population have no such a choice. They are heavily depen-
dent on food subsidies from farmers.5
It was this reasoning based on which the North Korean regime de-
veloped its Public Distribution System (this concerns not only food, but 
extends also to daily necessities such as clothes, shoes, radios, home ap-
pliances and TV sets – actually given as incentives during public holidays, 
in order to maintain a gratitude of the people to the Great Leader who was 
said to be the donor in person of these gifts) in the 1950s and 1960s and 
the central government used it very wisely as a tool for manipulating the 
whole population (Lankov 2013, p. 107). The regime did not choose money 
as the sole means of expressing labor value.6 The easiest way to control 
the ordinary people is through the very basic needs – food and shelter. The 
government promised to supply people with their basic necessities as far as 
the people were loyal to the government. If not, they were cut off from food, 
kicked out of their homes, moved to the countryside or eventually sent 
to a labor camp (for re–education). In this way, the whole population was 
not only under strict control but they were deprived of the desire to live in 
an oppression–free society.7 In this way people became passive in relation 
to the state, expecting nothing more than meeting their basic physiologi-
cal needs. Even farmers working in collective farms, technically owned by 
state, were not allowed to possess private plots exceeding 100 m2 (many 
times even not that much). Whereas farmers in other communist countries 
who were able to sustain themselves or even help other family members, 
their North Korean counterparts were heavily dependent on rations, even if 
they themselves produced food for the whole state (Frank 2010, p. 6).
Gradually a “3–tiered” structure of North Korean society, based on 
proximity to the center of power, evolved over time (Lankov 2013, p. 122). 
5 This phenomenon is vital during the whole history of North Korea, not only for a spe-
cific period as it was in the case of China or other Communist countries.
6 Wages are a mixture of salary expressed in money, combined with rations and differ-
ent kinds of subsidies.
7 That they have never experienced – 40 years of Japanese colonialism turned to Kim’s 
despotic regime right after liberation.
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The highest in ranking is a privileged group composed mainly of members 
of the Kim family loyal to the Leader, Kim Il–song’s comrades in arms 
from guerilla fighting times and their descendants, highest party cadres 
and army generals. The second and largest group, which is located in the 
middle of the social standing, are common people striving to survive every 
day, together with the vast group of middle and low level officers, bureau-
crats and party members (who were even under stronger surveillance from 
power forces). There is also a third group – politically “untouchables” who 
lost their social status due to adversity of the regime or sometimes caused 
by external conditions (a family member accused of treason). Transferring 
from one group to another (from lower to higher) is almost impossible 
(Lankov 2013, p. 124). This is the reality of “classless” society formally 
proclaimed by the regime. North Korea from its inception imposed the 
system of total control, widening its range and depth after the end of the 
Korean War. So, virtually every North Korean citizen has been thrust into 
a  system of surveillance and ideological indoctrination – the “organiza-
tional life” in a workplace8 along with the “inminban”9 system in a neigh-
borhood (Lankov 2013, p. 118). Army and police have an irreplaceable 
position in this system. The regime tries to control people’s activities 
(at work or at home) through not letting them have a private life, but live 
and concentrate their thoughts solely on work for the “socialist paradise” 
and central ideology. The magnitude of subjugation exceeded even that 
of Stalinist Soviet Union. If compared to other socialist systems around 
the world, the North Korean regime resembles much more Soviet style 
(known also in Central and Eastern Europe) than Asian style (in China or 
Vietnam) (Myers 2010).
3. Structural Changes Within North Korean Society
Everything would go well and the regime would have persisted in an 
unchanged form until today if not the turning point at end of the 1980s 
and beginning of the 1990s. Until the 1990s there was no internal source, 
or a driving force of reforms that could have initiated possible changes 
of North Korean society – no civil society, no opposition (either political, 
8 Everyone belonged to one of five organizations: Party Youth organization, Korean 
Workers Party, Trade Union, Agricultural Union, or Women’s Union.
9 “Inminban” means local community in the neighborhood – one block of flats, near 
houses etc.
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ideological or economic), not to speak about dissent.10 But 25 years ago 
the international system suddenly underwent a substantial shift, getting 
rid of decades long Cold War divisions. North Korea found itself in unen-
viable position, isolated and unable to reflect changes in the international 
community. With cutting off the subsidies from “brother nations” (the So-
viet Union, China, Central and Eastern Europe), the difficulties with sus-
taining its own population became even more visible. The North Korean 
regime, that was seeking more its own immediate survival than pursuing 
long–term solutions, showed a  low ability to adopt to the new circum-
stances in the international environment which led to the sequence of 
unfortunate (but in advance easily anticipated) events that stimulated 
structural changes (Cha 2012, p. 12).
It was 1994 when the Public Distribution System (PDS) after years of 
difficulties to fulfill its basic functions finally collapsed across the board. 
In the coming years North Korea experienced the worst famine in modern 
history of a developed nation (Haggard 2007, p. 1). Not only that, a col-
lapse of the PDS was only the first step, the others followed soon leading 
to an erosion of North Korean societal structure that brought about a dis-
ruption of the whole system at all levels. Self–reliance of the people in the 
means of income and food sustenance became the first objective of their 
everyday life. Since then North Korean society has changed and it will 
never be the same as prior to the famine. Even though the regime attempt-
ed to reverse that status (to return to the “good old days”) it was never 
successful. With the gradual, but inevitable collapse of the PDS in North 
Korea at the beginning of the 1990s, and the central government’s aban-
donment of its own people, the center of gravity shifted more and more to 
the heads of the people who were trying to feed themselves. The regime 
left no space for  the people – they are caught in a trap. While the majority 
of men are involved in state collapsed economy (state–owned companies, 
government agencies, army, police), North Korean women embarked on 
a difficult path to provide income for their families. Currently more than 
70 percent of household income comes from female entrepreneurial activ-
ities (Lankov 2013, p. 188). People rely on themselves, and not anymore 
on rations given by the government. It gave rise not only to dozens but 
hundreds of local markets (in Korean called jangmadang) that recently 
appeared all across the country where people (women above all) exchange 
goods, do barter or sell things to get hard currency – normally illegal in 
10 Due to constant purges from the very beginning of the DPRK’s existence.
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North Korea (to do private business and possess foreign currency). People 
involved in business have less time for ideological indoctrination that has 
actually weakened over two decades. They give bribes to local authorities 
who are responsible for regular ideology sessions in order to avoid them. 
Brian R. Myers’s (2010) account on the current ideological situation in 
North Korea may be true but only for North Korean elites. Ordinary peo-
ple are not bound to ideology anymore, they are more independent than 
ever before and the peoples’ trust toward Juche has withered. Ordinary 
people can feel that the regime has nothing to offer to them and thus a gap 
between the government and people has grown even bigger.
Even though consequences of these structural changes are not met 
with physical reality immediately, rather they are steady and long run, 
these changes are unavoidable and what is more important, irreversible. 
The contrast is even bigger in North Korea where individual activity, pri-
vate business or even farming for oneself was eradicated already in the 
1960s and Kim’s social experiment of a “classless” society appeared (Col-
lins 2012, p. 9). It is therefore fascinating that mushrooming jangmadang 
markets gave way to the marketization and, as explained earlier, the po-
litically stratified society of North Korea is gradually disappearing. On the 
other hand, another aspect of the polarization of North Korean society 
starts to prevail – wealth. But we cannot forget that a substantial part of 
the society is still marginalized, not only in the form of income, but also 
in access to resources (not only material, but also to education etc.).
But not everyone is able (or wants) to adapt to new circumstances. Some 
chose a different path – defection. Many escaped to China in the second half 
of the 1990s, never returning back. But there were also those who were able 
to earn some money and then came back to their families whom they left be-
hind. Many started businesses, based on these experiences, illegally crossing 
the border with China and bringing back valuable and scarce goods. But for 
high officials to escape the system, they must have found a very good reason 
for it (as was the case of Hwang Jang Yop11 and others). It is this condition 
that prevents elites from escaping from the North. And that is why defectors 
from the North in general have a lower educational background12.
11 North Korea’s main ideologist, marked as an original author of Juche.
12 If social stratification would be compared to a  chemical bond then the closer an 
electron is to the nucleus, the stronger bond they have. And vice–versa, the more 
distant, the easier way out of the influence of an atom. The same characteristic could 
be applied to the society in North Korea.
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When the East Asian nations were hit by “Hallyu” (Korean Wave) in 
the 2000s, North Korea was not an exception. At the end of the 1990s 
there were videos, in 2000 DVDs and currently USBs are being brought to 
North Korea (of course illegally) in droves causing ideological “pollution.” 
Those who defected to the South (and can afford them) make trans–border 
financial transactions to support left behinds (in the past Japanese Kore-
ans supported their relatives in North Korea until the 1980s). The society 
that has been cut of any contacts with the outside world is now “online” 
(Lee 2013, p. 195).13 
Rising economic polarization due to increasing wealth of the new 
business class together with political inequalities has brought about not 
only a break of equitable society but this has accumulated “free” money 
that their owners could spend on whatever they want. It was not in ac-
cordance with the classless society concept propagated by the government 
during the past 50 years. While the regime before could simply lie about 
the situation outside North Korea because the people had no idea what 
the external world looked like, currently no one is going to believe empty 
slogans that are easily confronted with reality. And it creates a huge gap 
between the people and their government.
Those three factors, namely disposable money, loosening ideological 
pressure and a picture of the outside world brought about another natural 
consequence – perception that the system has become a burden. Evidence 
of that is the widespread corruption, economic criminality (bribery), to-
gether with still existing food shortages present in everyday life. This 
leads to ever rising inequalities of living standards. As Eastern Europeans 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, skepticism and cynicism arouse as 
a natural fruit of an eroding socialist society. Now people in North Korea 
are becoming less willing to believe that this is the foreigners’ fault and 
they start to blame the government (Haggard & Noland 2011b, p. 29).14 
With the disintegration of the army and forces, people feel more confident 
to stand up against power.
Besides an overall development there are still huge regional differ-
ences and disparities. Pyongyang takes the central and somehow pecu-
liar position. As a capital, Pyongyang has always been preferential over 
13 Of course not in absolute terms, but people have a  relatively better picture of the 
outside world than ever before.
14 Theses facts are brought to light by many refugees escaping DPRK not only to China 
but also to South Korea.
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the rest of the country. Not everyone was allowed to reside in and even 
visit the city. Changes in North Korea are primarily reflected here and 
could be seen just walking its streets (billboards, mobile phones, cars, 
restaurants, hair styles, the latest fashion etc.). Another important city, 
Kaesong, sitting just on the border with South Korea, was the best suit-
able place for opening an industrial zone for South Korean companies 
(already running for more than ten years) (Manyin 2011). A presence of 
capitalist companies has a direct impact not only on the circa 50,000 
North Korean employees working here, but it is felt also in the whole 
region. With “Choco pies” – South Korean sweets that became an un-
official “currency” – people can pay for the goods or barter them. The 
situation of citizens living in big industrial cities (Hamhung, Nampo) 
differs from those who live in the countryside. On the other side of the 
country lie the regions bordering with China that have a  very special 
position. They develop under the rising influence of Chinese businesses 
– mostly mining.
One of the famine’s most severe consequences was the brutal re-
duction of the North Korean population in the second half of the 1990s 
(Haggard & Noland 2007, p. 1), thus causing essential changes in age 
structure, namely an aging population. In order to feed themselves North 
Korean farmers have no other choice than divert some portion of their 
food production (Hassig & Oh 2000, p. 51) and not to give everything 
to the government. In fact, selling these diverted portions in the market 
bring a needed income to their decrepit households (Bennett 2013, p. 33). 
Famine brought about a  change in family structure and family bonds. 
Thousands of children lost their parents (or even worst the whole family) 
leaving them vulnerable.
The society frozen in the 1960s has finally started to thaw. Not 
every aspect of these changes promises a better future for its inhabitants. 
On the other hand, we cannot forget about today’s new reality – North 
Korean elites are helplessly staring at the changes within North Korean 
society perceiving that a power center has shifted from the central gov-
ernment to the masses. The government has realized that structural 
changes are threatening the very existence of regime but they are in-
dispensable (Lankov 2013, p. 119). Currently elites are more and more 
separated from the people. A rising number of recent executions (Kwon 
& Whiteman 2015) of the highest level officials is evidence of Kim Jong–
un’s fear and despair about the rising North Korean society’s awareness 
Miloš Procházka56
(at all levels) of the regime’s weaknesses. One thing we can be pretty 
sure of – there is no will to further any political or economic reforms in 
the North, unless a certain pro–reformist clique would come to power. 
But that scenario is less probable due to frequent purges among political 
and military elites.
4. Changes in North Korean Society and What 
Superpowers Have to Do with It
Looking at the changing environment within North Korea the ques-
tion arises what was the impact on North Korean society caused by the 
changes in the international environment and what role the major powers 
played in it.
During the Cold War North Korea used divisions within the Com-
munist camp and shifted its preferences alternately from the Soviet 
Union to China. North Korea during four decades learnt how to use 
others for its own benefit (Michishita 2010, p. 6). With the fall of East-
ern European socialist countries (the Soviet Union followed soon after) 
and with the transformation of China these advantages suddenly ended. 
But acquired “skills” were not forgotten. North Korea adjusted to the 
changed international situation in their own way. The regime used its 
developing nuclear program for deterrence. In this way the first nuclear 
crisis emerged (Armstrong 2013, p. 25). The United States (US), with 
help of international community (at the beginning with non–state ac-
tor mediation), got involved and resolved the crisis (Wit, Poneman & 
Gallucci 2004). But North Korea was already on its way to famine that 
hit the country while superpowers were helplessly sitting by. The first 
response came only in 1995 when the famine broke on a grand scale. 
Massive aid from international donors flowed into the country until 
2001 (Manyin 2014).
Another shift came in 2002 when US President George W. Bush de-
scribed North Korea as a “rogue regime” (Becker 2005, p. 1), placing her 
among the “axis of evil” countries (countries supporting international 
terrorism) and pushing other countries to play the same game. North 
Korea responded with the traditional approach – deterring others with 
nukes. As a natural consequence, sanctions followed soon. The second 
nuclear crisis developed on a  large scale (Joo & Kwak 2007, p. 29). 
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Six–party talks were only a  lifeline thrown to save the situation. But 
participating countries (China, the US, Russia, Japan and South Ko-
rea) tried to meet unrealistic expectations with respect to North Ko-
rean transformation. Seen from the perspective of superpowers’ effort 
during the past two decades to compel North Korea to change, we can 
see that the North Korean regime wants not to be reformed (under 
pressure from the outside). The gradual transformation caused by the 
transformation of the regime is pure illusion. Unless the change would 
come from inside (society). Moreover, within the past 25 years we have 
witnessed how diplomacy with regard to North Korea failed across the 
board. The Korean Peninsula is nor safer (North Korea did not give up 
its nuclear endeavor) nor is it more stable (economic downfall seems to 
be unstoppable).
Despite many proclamations, the Great Powers play this (egoistic) 
game – they are willing to keep benefits for themselves, thus maintaining 
the status quo (powers do not concern themselves about North Korea’s 
welfare). Powers are more likely to donate humanitarian aid than letting 
the free flow of changes with an uncertain end. On the other hand, the 
North Korean regime is unable to fully consolidate its power (not only po-
litical, but also economic, ideological and in no less degree also prestige). 
Apart from the superpowers, it is principally South Korea that should care 
about a common solution. But the South Korean society’s interest in uni-
fication faded substantially, reaching the lowest levels ever (Lankov 2013, 
p. 158). This disinterest is spreading mainly among the younger genera-
tion who would be a potential bearer of unification and who would take 
upon their shoulders the burdens of a unified state (not only economic). 
South Korean elites (political and economic) should show their readiness 
(or goodwill?) to backup costs of unification economically, but the reality 
is different. So far, South Korean “unification policy” has only been a pile 
of verbal expressions not followed by substantial action. So the real inten-
tions of the government are thus dubious.
On top of that, in recent years we are witnessing major shift in Chi-
nese military power. China is no more third–class player. To the contrary, 
China became local military and political dominant leader that no one 
will dare to challenge.15 Along with the US, China plays the premium 
position in international trade and according to GDP (in purchasing pow-
15 Chinese dominance over South China Sea (conflict with Vietnam), with the Phil-
ippines etc.
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er parity) is also the biggest economy of the world (Knoema 2015). Thus 
China plays a decisive role in the Northeast Asian region and no mea-
sure could be done without Chinese approval. Especially if China shares 
a 1600 km long common border with an unstable neighbor that could be 
a source of streams of refugees in the case of North Korean collapse (Vox 
2015). China is the last of superpowers that would wish dramatic changes 
in its neighborhood. This is the primary reason why China is currently 
so involved (in the North Korean problem) and supports North Korea di-
rectly (food, heavy oil subsidies) and indirectly (investment in mining, 
industrial parks).
To sum up the facts, we can expect with a high degree of probability 
that the main actors in East Asia, namely the US, China, Japan, Russia 
and South Korea (even though the US together with South Korea worked 
on a contingency plan for North Korea (Feffer 2014)), are not well prepared 
for a possible collapse of North Korea. There is no common approach to-
ward North Korea because every player defends their own interests, often 
contradictory. On the accounts of foreign–imposed regime change (FIRC) 
research (Downes & Monten 2013, pp. 90–131) it has been proven that 
regime change caused by an external force did not bring about regime 
democratization in most cases. It is therefore naïve to think that in the 
case of North Korea the process of change caused by e.g. military interven-
tion (as was the case of Iraq) would result in the adoption of democratic 
principles by North Korea.
Maybe those scholars who oppose a viewpoint that North Korea will 
(sooner or later) collapse are right. But we have to consider the conse-
quences of their ratio. Does it mean that there is no need to be ready for 
a possible collapse? If powers would follow their opinion the negative im-
pact of such actions could possibly cause a greater damage to the people 
of North Korea. It is better to be ready and to create in advance a roadmap 
for actions after North Korea’s collapse in case this scenario would come 
true.16 We need to embark on the exploration of twofold change – one is 
a fundamental change in the approach of US and China towards North 
Korea and the other is a change in North Korean society itself. For now, 
there is no political alternative for the people, so we cannot expect politi-
cal change in coming months.
16 There is a greater degree of susceptibility to collapse in the near future according to 
some researchers. Among them are Bruce Bennet, Andrei Lankov and Paul French.
59Changes Within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Society...
5. Changes in North Korean Society and What 
Non–State Actors Have to Do with It
The Role of Non–Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
International relations theories (neo–realism in particular) show us that 
the main role in North Korean issue is played by nation states – notably su-
perpowers involved in the six–party talks (South Korea, the US, Japan, China 
and Russia), imposing sanctions or providing humanitarian assistance to the 
DPRK. But the six–party talks led to the stalemate, sanctions just worsen the 
everyday lives of millions in North Korea (while the top elite still live in luxu-
ry) and their humanitarian assistance is weakening. Even though superpow-
ers have “power” to change the situation on the Korean Peninsula in a jiffy, 
relations between North Korea and them have not changed substantially.
On the other hand, NGO involvement, as a part of what is called “soft 
power” (Merickova 2014, pp. 187–197) is basically a long distance race. We 
cannot expect immediate results when looking at the society. In fact, the 
prime objective of NGO activities in a  certain country (maybe except for 
Human Rights advocacy NGOs) is not to bring about the collapse of that 
country’s regime (Feffer 2012). Looking at the role of NGOs in general, we 
can take as an example a document listed in “Principles and good practice 
of humanitarian donorship” endorsed in Stockholm on June 17, 2003, in 
the part titled “Objectives and definition of humanitarian action” where the 
primary objective is defined as: “The objectives of humanitarian action are to 
save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the 
aftermath of man–made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and 
strengthen preparedness for the occurrence.” (Lewis & Kanji 2009, p. 188).
Besides that, NGOs are primarily “implementers” (mobilization of 
resources to provide goods and services to people who need them), “cata-
lysts” (ability to inspire, facilitate or contribute to improved thinking and 
action to promote change) and “partners” (work together with another 
and share the risk or benefit from a joint venture) (Lewis & Kanji 2009, 
p. 12). So NGOs can bring about a change in the society, but only indi-
rectly through a process of the society’s involvement in many projects ini-
tiated by NGOs in an environment of “complex political emergencies.”17
17 The term means multi–casual humanitarian crises as stated in “There is broad 
agreement that complex humanitarian emergencies can be generally defined by: the 
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Structure of Assistance to the DPRK
We can look at the structure of assistance from the donor perspective 
and recipient perspective. If seen from the recipient perspective, basically, 
we can categorize a three–fold approach to the DPRK based on the target 
group within (3–tiered) North Korean society (Foley 2013, p. 3). The wid-
est group – the middle class (of course in North Korean terms) is targeted 
by humanitarian (lower part of that group) or developmental (upper part) 
assistance from international organizations, NGOs or governments aim-
ing to help the most needed (by aiding them with basic necessities like 
food, medicine, water sanitation projects) or to recover its decimated agri-
culture (irrigation, farms, seeding plants, reforestation, greenhouses etc.) 
and industry (mining, Kaesong Industrial Complex, Pyonghwa Motors), 
respectively. Businessmen focus on an emerging entrepreneurial class that 
rose among the current political elite. On the opposite side of the societal 
spectrum is a group of gulag prisoners, a focus of human rights advocacy 
groups. They did not choose engagement, but confrontation as a means of 
approach toward North Korea (Feffer 2012).18 
The structure of donorship, that is international assistance (engage-
ment approach) to the DPRK, differs substantially according to each do-
nor’s (the US, China, South Korea, Japan and EU) preferences. To a greater 
degree the aid is under heavy constraints of each nation’s foreign policy.
Overview of Assistance to the DPRK (1995~2014)
Soon after North Korea asked for humanitarian aid from the in-
ternational community in 1995, South Korea (the government in fact) 
responded as first donating 150,000 metric tons of rice worth 232,000 
USD (Snyder 2004, pp. 272–275). And the South Korean government 
remained as South Korea’s sole donor of humanitarian aid to the North 
deterioration or collapse of central government authority, conflict and widespread 
human rights abuses, food insecurity, macroeconomic collapse, and mass forced dis-
placement of people. Humanitarian action in such situations requires managing an 
extremely sensitive linkage with a number of security agendas, the most basic of 
which involves the security of the humanitarian actors themselves and their ability 
to obtain access to affected populations.” (Foley 2013, p. 4–5)
18 Along with South Korean fanatic Christian groups sending leaflets in balloons across 
the borders.
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until 1997.19 South Korean NGOs were among the first to respond to 
famine in North Korea, but it was not until 1998, after Kim Dae–Jung 
took power, when they were granted a more independent approach from 
the South Korean government. Since then they acted independently and 
supplemented the government’s aid. South Korean NGOs played a sig-
nificant role in activating South Korean society for support to pro–North 
attitudes (Lee & Kim 2014, pp. 121–143). Since then the situation has 
become slightly better allowing some South Korean NGOs to take initia-
tive (Snyder 2007, pp. 423–430), but the government still plays a major 
role. The disadvantage of such a system is that aid donations and devel-
opment projects are heavily dependent on current political preferences 
of the ruling party. The shift was particularly notable when the sunshine 
policy of Kim Dae–Jung and No Moo–Hyun changed to Lee Myung–
Bak’s confrontational policy (Paik 2013, p. 245).20 
The US in a very similar manner (as South Korea) was a major donor 
to UN Agencies and almost an exclusive donor to KEDO21 (Calder 2004). 
In 1998 the US government initiated the US Private Voluntary Organiza-
tion Consortium that roofed US based NGOs working in North Korea as 
a way to transfer the help of NGOs and private donors. The Consortium 
operated in North Korea between 1997 and 2000. Then it dissolved and 
each NGO played on its own. The total amount of assistance coming from 
the US (between 1995 and 2014) was 1.2 billion USD (Manyin 2014, p. 1) 
which is 40 percent of overall assistance to the DPRK. After North Korea 
withdrew from the six–party talks in 2009 and fired missiles in 2012, the 
US has halted all support to North Korea (Lankov 2013, p. 164).
China’s trade with North Korea dropped radically in the first half of 
1990s, but after 2000 the mutual trade shows steady growth reaching 
nearly 1 billion USD in 2014 (Haggard & Noland 2011, p. 17). If we look 
at the trade deficit of North Korea with China it is evident that China is 
19 There was no possibility for anyone (individual, business, or organization) from 
South Korea to be directly involved in aid for North Korea until 1997 according to 
South Korean law.
20 Government not only completely stopped the aid sent to the North, but on top of that 
they did not allow the South Korean NGOs to bring it instead.
21 KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) is an organization 
founded by South Korea, Japan and the US in 1995 in order to implement 1994 
US–North Korea Agreed Framework to stop the North Korea’s nuclear power devel-
opment in Yongbyon in exchange for light water reactor built in North Korea and 
supply of fuel oil until a new power plant is constructed.
Miloš Procházka62
trying to tie North Korea to itself. China is not providing food and other 
commodities to North Korea based on internationally acclaimed princi-
ples of humanitarian aid but China is providing food either as direct sub-
sidies or at subsidized prices (Kim 2011, pp. 257–271).
Other international organizations and international NGOs joined 
soon after and they played a major role in assisting to overcome famine 
in the North from 1996. Among those organizations involved in aid were 
major UN agencies22, regional branches of the Red Cross23, Government 
Organizations24, International NGOs25, European NGOs with residential 
status26, US27 and South Korean NGOs (Lee 2009)28.
Europe has quite a  different approach to North Korea compared 
with its American, South Korean or Chinese counterparts (Lee 2010, 
pp. 45–51). At first, Europe is a multinational union of states (and thus 
a  mixture of often competing interests) (Park 2010, p. 35). European 
NGOs participation in North Korean restoration is somehow inferior 
in scope but they are quite successful in the stability they offer. Out of 
many NGOs who were present in North Korea over the past two decades 
22 UN Development Program (UNDP), World Food Program (WFP), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Population 
Fund (UNFPA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
23 International Red Cross/International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
24 EU Food Security Unit, EU ECHO, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 
Italian Development and Cooperation Office, French Cooperation Bureau, Centre for 
Agricultural Bioscience International.
25 Action Contra La Faim, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Associazione con 
I Fatebenfratelli per i Malati Lontani, Children’s Aid Direct, Cap Anamu, Cooper-
azione e Sviluppo, Campus fuer Christus, German Agro Action, Help Age Interna-
tional, Medicines du Monde, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, PMU Interlife, Ge-
sellschaft für Nachhaltige Entwicklung (Association for Sustainable Development), 
Global Resource Services, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), Mission East.
26 Premiere Urgence, Save the Children, Concern Worldwide, Deutsche Welthungerhil-
fe, Triangle Generation Humanitaire, Handicap International.
27 American Friends Service Committee, Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Global Re-
source Services, Christian Friends of Korea, World Vision International, Eugene Bell 
Foundation.
28 Korean Sharing Movement, Okedongmu Children in Korea, Join Together Society of 
Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation; The Presbyterian Church of Korea, Lighthouse Foun-
dation, World Vision Korea, Good Neighbors International, Korean Welfare Foun-
dation, Food for the Hungry International, Green Doctors, Korean Medical Associ-
ation, Unifi cation Agricultural Production Forum, Korea Maranatha Foundation, 
Agape International, Chosun Exchange.
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six European NGOs still have resident status. Others left the country 
due to different reasons – either willingly (lack of accountability and 
transparency on the North Korean part) or by force (loss of credibility in 
North Korean eyes).
Current Situation
Looking back to the beginning of the 2000s, the sharp decline has 
been recorded in overall funding of aid to the DPRK (Manyin 2014) (may-
be only with the Chinese exception that is providing food to North Korea 
not on humanitarian principles). UN Agencies are not an exception. Be-
tween 2004 and 2014 there was reduction from around 300 million USD 
to some 50 million USD of aid per year (Reliefweb 2015). It is far less than 
what millions of North Koreans need in order not to stunt or die.
Recent surveys show that out of the total population (24.62 million), 
almost 18 million North Koreans do not consume an adequately diverse 
diet (WFP 2015) and they are marked as “food insecure” (they lack nutri-
tional diversity). Out of them, 1.8 million people (notably children up to 
5 years, pregnant and lactating women, and elderly) are in need of spe-
cialized nutritious foods to combat malnutrition. Still, the general popu-
lation cannot afford basic necessities of life – food, clothing, medication, 
healthcare. Even though global chronic malnutrition (stunting) decreased 
over the past 15 years (Reliefweb 2015), still 27.9 percent are severely 
hit (UNICEF 2012). The even more urgent thing is that 4 percent suf-
fer global acute malnutrition (wasting). This is a stunning fact. Agricul-
tural production, despite of few developmental projects aiming to grow 
outputs and modernize vintage agriculture in North Korea, is vulnerable 
due to impending natural disasters – either floods or droughts. Climate 
vulnerability is high due to the plundering style of agriculture over the 
past decades (large–scale use of fertilizers, neglecting care for irrigation, 
deforestation etc.) causing reduction in soil quality. This has led to a de-
crease of food production on one hand and on the other, it led to environ-
mental instability (which is a  full circle). Together with outdated water 
pipes it shows us an overall picture of the sanitation situation and health 
care needs. As a result, around seven million North Koreans lack access to 
clean water and over six million people need basic health care which they 
do not get. The only natural result is the spreading of infectious diseases 
– tuberculosis, diarrhea, pneumonia (Reliefweb 2015).
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Pros & Cons
Like with any other human endeavor, there are certain controversies 
connected to humanitarian and developmental assistance. Scholars do 
not agree on the same interpretation of assistance impacts. Some scholars 
blame aid activist to be naïve and idealistic, reckoning numerous negative 
consequences that their operations brought to the society. Let us mention 
a few of them.
Regime’s survival
Hardliners like to stress that humanitarian aid policy did not contrib-
ute to regime change – either reforms, giving up of nuclear development 
etc. But this stance is likable only to the voters’ ears, not to the affected 
people (North Koreans). The North Korean government knew very well 
already at the beginning of the1990s that the food situation was unsus-
tainable. They took no steps to correct the situation. On the contrary, 
they used millions of dollars for nuclear development instead. They let 
the situation come to a state where famine had already come. If hardlin-
ers suggest that in 1995 the international community should not have 
intervened (and stopped food aid to North Korea), then we must reckon 
with the consequences – not only in North Korea (much wider popula-
tion would be affected by famine), but implications would affect probably 
South Korea, if not the whole region (see what a hard–line stance did in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria).
Lacking reliable information about the situation of the society
The changes occurring within North Korean society are for the (ma-
jority of) outside observers obscure. The changes within do not hit the 
headlines of newspapers and television news. In a similar way that the 
changes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s took place underneath, 
something alike happens in North Korea now (Frank 2010, p. 6). The only 
thing is to capture and interpret them in the right way.
The secretive character of the regime makes us subjected to scarce in-
formation flowing out of the North Korea. Even though some of the high 
representatives of the state escaped (and this could be seen as a precious 
source of information) and the rising number of North Korean defectors 
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in South Korea can bear witness to the present situation in the North, it 
is risky to be dependent only on them. The reliability of data and its ac-
curacy is lowered by a small number of samples and inaccessibility to (or 
simply missing) surveys.
UN agencies and NGO workers that stayed in North Korea over the 
years following the famine are another valuable source of information. 
Even though their help was limited in scope and outreach, basically, they 
could gather some data on North Korean society otherwise inaccessible 
for external research.
Diversion of food aid
During 20 years of aid to North Korea it often happened that some 
organizations withdrew their help due to different reasons. One of them 
was the suspicion of humanitarian aid diversion to the military and loyal 
subjects (Haggard & Noland 2007, p. 117). The withdrawal was justified, 
partially, based on true facts. What is more striking is that the govern-
ment diverted rations from the PDS (normally given to ordinary people) to 
the military to a much greater extent (compared to a diversion of rations 
from food aid). But the government would have done it anyway, so it is 
a better choice to bring food to the needy (and not let them die) even if 
it means indirect support for the government. Some part of the food aid 
has been diverted to local markets, too. This at least contributed to the 
marketization of society and raised pressure to cut food prices (Haggard 
& Noland 2007, p. 121). Anyway, accountability in North Korean condi-
tions is a great challenge.
Limited scope of influence
Unlike UN Agencies, NGOs focus mainly on small scale projects 
helping to restore irrigation, sanitation, hospitals, kindergartens, build 
greenhouses, farms etc. Such projects in their scopes do not hit a huge 
crowd of millions, but try to improve the lifestyles of those directly con-
nected to project areas. In this way, NGOs try to build personal connec-
tions and bonds with local people (common citizens and authorities as 




The PDS has collapsed many years ago and today’s youngest gen-
eration has never lived in a functioning PDS system. Opponents accuse 
humanitarian and developmental assistance supporters of trying to fill 
the “black hole,” pouring tons of food into the system that is diverting 
and misusing the aid for keeping itself alive. Opponents try to discourage 
aid donors to continue their help hoping that the discontinuation of “gifts 
for free” would result in regime collapse. This concept is somehow naïve 
because you cannot isolate the country absolutely, there will always exist 
a way the regime could illegally trade with other states or non–state actors 
(international drug dealers, terrorist organizations, arms dealers etc.) and 
receive much needed money to sustain its power.
Incoordination 
Despite of the great efforts of parties involved in international do-
norship to North Korea, coordination is actually a great challenge to all. 
Actions of humanitarian and development aid that are not coordinated 
can lead to chaos. On the other hand, the only counterpart of aid is the 
North Korean government (and local officials as an extended arm of gov-
ernment). So the government is in the more advantageous position, able 
to select those donors who “play their game.”
Benefits of NGO Involvement
Lessons learnt
The non–state actors have an irreplaceable role in this process 
(even though there is a split view on the role of non–state actors as rel-
evant players in international relations). During their 20 years of pres-
ence and active participation in North Korean society’s issues, NGOs 
could learn certain “lessons” that can help them understand North 
Korean society and make their assistance even more effective (Reed 
2005, pp. 51–72).
NGOs could accumulate valuable experience working with North 
Koreans (ordinary people and officials). The response of North Korean 
professional counterparts was positive and enthusiastic. Specifically, they 
67Changes Within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Society...
received not only physical help (technology), but also participated in lec-
tures and training programs at home or abroad. With time passing by, 
even officials have become more open and cooperative (to the degree of 
their capacity). NGOs could focus on respective project areas over a longer 
period of time. So they could build relationships with local people, under-
stand them and help them in a more responsive way.
Positive attitudes
Giving the ratio to Wendy Sherman, an adviser to Madeleine Albright 
and a special adviser to US President Bill Clinton on North Korea, who 
described the dilemma:
“I have no illusions about Kim … he is a leader who has left his people with no free-
dom, no choices, no food, no future. People are executed. There are labor camps. But 
the decision we have to make is whether to try to deal with him to open the country 
so that the people of North Korea do have freedom, do have choices, do have food. 
Do I think it would be preferable to not deal with him? Yes, but the consequences are 
horrible, so you have to deal with him.” (Park 2015)
We can just agree with such an opinion. Moreover, we cannot expect 
that during turmoil in North Korea, the Korean Workers Party29 or mili-
tary would change and help people. They would be caught in self–indul-
gence, taking care of nothing else but their own well–being. In this case 
NGO workers would be the only actors ready to help – and what is more 
important that North Korea would be fully aware of that. North Koreans 
cannot rely on the state, party, military, police – old regime structures – 
but on foreigners (Americans, South Koreans, Germans, etc.).
Necessity of aid
Without the help of international donors there would be hardly 
enough food for North Korean citizens (Dalton & Jung. 2009). The be-
havior of the North Korean regime, particularly over the past three dec-
ades, is a living proof of such a statement. Challenging this fact would 
only lead to the worsening of an already bad situation of millions of 
North Koreans.
29 Leading party in North Korea, with a secured position in constitution.
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Preparedness
If current situation in North Korea looks threatening, what about 
a situation of North Korean society during collapse? It would be many 
times worse than today. In order not to get into such a state, it is nec-
essary to explore the two aspects of involvement of non–state actors in 
the collapse of the DPRK (with respect to two decades of experience in 
helping North Korean society). One is the role that non–state actors 
could play in the (indirect) preparation for North Korean collapse and 
the other is the role in the course of probable collapse itself (a massive 
flow humanitarian aid). A part of such a strategy is to target North Ko-
rea with involvement of non–state actors that can participate in specific 
fields of activities. This is a real way that NGOs in general could be even 
more involved.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was not to predict the collapse of the North 
Korean regime. Instead, analyzing structural changes of North Korean so-
ciety show us possible ways of future development. We have to put aside 
naivety and idealism dealing with the North Korean regime. Assessing the 
real situation, we can surmise that superpowers (or any other state that 
would be involved) are incapable to do any substantial progress on the 
Korean Peninsula with the current approach, rather to the contrary, they 
have no real plan or roadmap created (peaceful, not a military one). The 
only real thing that we can count on are NGOs, UN Agencies, optimistic 
businessmen and a bulk of other engaged supportive people. In this sense, 
this paper is rather a careful outline of the way that North Korean society 
could be heading in the near future based on previous experience with the 
work of humanitarian organizations.
For over 20 years many people have been watching North Korea as 
closely as they could, but scarce information flowing out of the country 
makes it even more difficult to outline any future development. Still there 
are much more unknown variables than those we can say are known. 
They wish that North Korea would be changed for the better, but there 
are no signs of such a peaceful top–down change. Rather to the contrary, 
there is more and more evidence of social change from the bottom that 
can eventually lead to unrest.
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In the case of social or political unrest (civil war) in a particular, usually 
help from NGOs for the country comes after such unrest occurs (Bennett 
2013, p. 147).30 The international community usually has difficulties to 
anticipate coming crises even though we capture some signs of impending 
disaster in advance. But if we suppose that a crisis on the Korean Pen-
insula is an inevitable result of past decades we can much more easily 
anticipate the coming events with a certain probability and thus prepare 
concrete steps for appeasing tough times that could come.
In every society women, children (especially those at a very young age) 
and elderly are the most vulnerable and marginalized social groups when 
social unrest is a viable form of change. A collapse of the regime inevitably 
brings such unrest into account. Unless they stay at home, some form of 
aid can come to them. But if the situation is unbearable and they decide to 
leave their homes in multitudes (see refugees all around the globe), access 
to help becomes difficult.
The recent involvement of NGOs could prove that the most impor-
tant result of their activities is a creation of bonds and connections all 
across North Korea. If rampant changes occur in North Korea this could 
be a  viable alternative for the country’s citizens that can substantially 
help people to overcome crisis. People can stay at home where living con-
ditions are more bearable compared to those in refugee camps.
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